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In this paper we examine the determinants of location choices of multinational firms in Europe. 
In particular, we focus on the role of EU Cohesion Policy in attracting foreign investors from 
both within and outside Europe. Using data on 5,509 foreign subsidiaries established in 50 
regions in 8 EU countries over the period 1991-1999, we estimate a mixed logit model of the 
determinants of MNFs’ location choices. We find that, after controlling for the role of 
agglomeration economies as well as a number of other regional and country characteristics and 
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1. Introduction 
According to a rather established literature, in presence of increasing returns and local 
externalities, economic integration leads to the spatial concentration of productive activities 
(Fujita et al., 1999). In the European Union, this uneven spatial impact of economic integration 
has provided an important motivation for a set of policy measures, known as the EU Cohesion 
Policy, aimed to counteract social and economic disparities. In particular, Structural Funds 
(SF) and Cohesion Funds (CF) have been allocated to help transform and modernise the 
structure of relatively poorer regions, and to prepare them for competition within the EU Single 
Market (European Commission, 1996). As documented by Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman 
(2002), using sectoral data on regional value added, SF have indeed influenced the location of 
industry in Europe. In the light of a dramatic growth of multinational activity in the EU, which 
became the largest recipient of FDIs over the nineties, it is timely to investigate whether the 
cohesion policy has affected the geographic distribution of FDIs within the EU. Accordingly, 
this paper quantifies the effects of SF and CF on multinational firms’ location choices among 
European regions.  
The paper improves on the existing empirical literature concerning MNFs’ location 
determinants and the role of Cohesion Policy in at least three ways. First, we address this set of 
issues by exploiting a very large firm-level data-set which enables both to consider a wide 
range of recipient countries and to place no limitation on the country of origin of investors. 
Specifically, we use data on the location choices of 5,509 affiliates of multinational firms 
(MNFs) between 1991 and 1999 and over a set of 50 NUTS-1 regions in 8 EU countries 
(France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom).
1 Other works 
have studied location determinants in general and Cohesion Policy in particular, but they have 
                                                           
1 NUTS is an acronym for Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics which indicates a hierarchical 
classification of administrative areas used by the official European statistical office (Eurostat). NUTS levels (1-3) 
indicate different degrees of aggregation. See the appendix for more details.   3
either used very aggregate data at the national level; or they have focused on individual 
recipient countries; or they have considered only one country of origin of investors.  
Second, we investigate whether the nationality of the parent firm determines a different 
sensitiveness to location characteristics. In particular, we compare the impact of Cohesion 
Policy and other location determinants of MNFs from European and non-European countries, 
investing in the EU: the single largest home country is the US (25%), but the majority of 
investors are from EU countries (60%). 
Third, we provide a methodological contribution by estimating a mixed logit model on 
MNFs’ location choices. This allows us to capture less restrictive substitution patterns between 
choices than standard conditional and nested logit models used in this context so far.  
Our most fundamental finding is that SF and CF have played a significant role for the 
attractiveness of peripheral regions, thus contributing to shape FDI patterns in Europe. We also 
show that agglomeration economies are a major determinant of MNFs’ location decisions for 
all investors. Finally, we demonstrate that European investors have responded differently than 
non-European investors to market-related variables, to the characteristics of the labor market 
and to the level of corporate taxation. This result is consistent with the idea that the two groups 
of investors may have different motivations for setting-up foreign plants in the EU. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the empirical strategy and how this 
differs from previous works. Section 3 presents the data and variables included in the 
econometric model . Section 4 illustrates the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Empirical strategy  
2.1. Modeling location decisions 
Following convention (see, for example, Devereux and Griffith, 1998 and Head and Mayer, 
2004), we assume that a firm first chooses whether to serve a foreign market (which, in the 
context of our empirical analysis, would be the EU market) and then decides whether to do so 
with exports, licensing, collaborative ventures, FDI or some combinations. Finally, it decides   4
to undertake FDI, the firm chooses where to set up its activity. Herein, we focus on this last 
step of the decision process. Therefore, our analysis is conditional on MNFs having decided to 
set up production in Europe, assuming that the (simplified) behavioral framework we have 
illustrated is appropriate. In section 2.3 we will discuss some caveats in the interpretation of 
results, whenever this hypothesis would not hold true.  
It is worth mentioning that earlier studies have also been limited to particular aspects of 
investing firms’ behavior. Devereux and Griffith (1998) have accounted for the export/FDI 
decision and, in case of FDI, for the location of US firms in the EU, but they have been 
constrained by data availability to consider rather aggregated choice sets (countries). On the 
contrary, most studies addressing the determinants of location choices of foreign firms at a 
rather disaggregated level have been constrained to focus on location choices within individual 
countries without taking into account the determinants of the export/FDI decision (Basile, 
2004; Crozet et al., 2004; Barrios et al., 2006; Guimaraes et al., 2000; Devereux et al., 2002a). 
Some recent works have analyzed location choices at a Pan-European level using regional data, 
but they have usually focused on investors from one specific country, such as France (Disdier 
and Mayer, 2004) or Japan (Head and Mayer, 2004). Similar comments apply to the literature 
on FDI and SF. Studies based on cross-country data have been constrained to observe 
correlations between FDI and SF at a very aggregated level. For instance Breuss et al. (2006) 
have analyzed OECD investments in the EU15 and CEECs over the period 1986-1997, and 
Hubert and Pain (2002) have examined German FDI in the EU over the nineties. The former 
found that SF encouraged FDI while the latter found the opposite. Other studies have used 
more detailed data, but have been compelled to limit their analysis to a single recipient country. 
For instance, Crozet et al. (2004) have used firm level data on FDI in 90 French regions and 
found very little effect of structural policies on foreign investment location decisions.  
The present work takes the perspective of the location of MNFs within Europe without any 
constraint on the country of origin of the investing firms. Therefore, while it does not take   5
alternative entry modes into account, it provides a rather good representation of firms’ location 
decision within Europe and an appropriate framework to test for the role of the Cohesion 
Policy in this choice.  
2.2 Econometric method: Mixed Logit Models 
Our empirical model of MNFs’location choices takes the same form as random utility 
models. Assume that a firm chooses location j if it yields the highest profit among the set of 
alternatives (i.e.  il ij π π >   lj ∀≠  and l = 1,…,L). Further, decompose the profit firm i realizes 
from location site (region) j ( πιj) into a deterministic part (Vij) that depends linearly on 
observable attributes of the region and of the firm (X) and on a stochastic part εij:  
ij ij ij ij ij X V ε β ε π + ′ = + =    (1) 
Profit maximization then implies that firm i chooses location j if  ij il il ij V V ε ε − > − .  
Following Berry (1994) and Train (2003) we write the error term as: 
ij ij i ij ij ij u Y u v + ′ = + = μ ε    (2) 
where  ij Y  is a vector of variables observed for the firm i and the alternative j (the region where 
to invest),  μ  is a vector of randomly distributed parameters with density  ) (μ g  over all firms 
and  ij u   is an iid  error term (with type I extreme value distribution). Without any loss of 
generality, we assume that the vector  μ  has a mean equal to zero, so that we can interpret the 
term  ij iY μ′   as an error component which induces heteroskedasticity and correlation over 
alternatives in the unobserved portion of utility. In fact, the error covariance between any two 
choices j and l is:  WY Y u Y E u Y E Cov il il i ij ij i il ij ′ = + ′ + ′ = ) ( ) ( ) , ( μ μ ε ε , where W is the covariance 
of  i μ . Therefore, substitution patterns between alternatives result both from correlation 
between Ys and from the covariance matrix of  i μ .    6
This error component specification is very general and various substitution patterns can 
be obtained by an appropriate choice of variables (Y) to enter as error components. For 
example, the standard McFadden’s (1974) Conditional Logit (CL) model corresponds to a 
specification where the vector of variables with random parameters (Y) is identically zero, so 
that no correlation exists between alternatives. An analogue to the nested logit model (NL) can 
be obtained by defining Y as a set of dummy variables (djk) which take value 1 for each 
alternative j in a nest k and zero elsewhere.  
Substituting (2) into (1), we express firm i payoff from locating in region j as:  
ij ij i
K
k jk ik ij ij ij i ij ij u X d X u Y X + ′ + + ′ = + ′ + ′ = ∑ = ) * (
1 μ μ β μ β π    (3) 
Here we have broken the error component term ( ij iY μ′ ) consists of two parts. The first part 
includes K country dummies ( jk d ) whose coefficients ( ik μ ) have a normal distribution with 
mean zero and variance  k σ . The random quantity  ik μ  will then enter the profit obtained by 
each alternative in nest k, inducing correlation among these alternatives, so that the variance 
k σ  would capture the magnitude of correlation between two alternatives in nest k, playing a 
role analogous to the inclusive value parameter in NL models. In the second part of the error 
component we introduce the full set of variables which are also used to model location decision 
(X). The elements of the vector  i *′ μ  are normally distributed random parameters with mean 
equal to zero and variance Ω. Note that this specification not only allows for intra-country 
similarity, mimicking a country-based nested logit structure, it adds extra sources of correlation 
across choices, allowing more complex substitution patterns
2. 
                                                           
2 A behavioral implication of conditional logit models is that all pairs of alternatives are equally dissimilar 
(Hensher et al., 2005). Nested Logit models maintain this property across nests but not within them. Thus, to use a 
nested logit model in the present context, we would have to search for a nesting structure that satisfies this 
property. Both inferential and Bayesian approaches have been developed to identify the nesting structure which 
would be most supported by the data (Hensher et al., 2005; Poirier, 1996). However, as the number of alternatives 
rises, the number of possible nests (that is the number of possible non-overlapping combinations of alternatives)   7
Under the above assumptions on  ij u  (iid with type I extreme value distribution), it can be 
shown that the probability of firm i choosing region j is the integral of a standard logit 
probability over a density of parameters  ) (μ g . The distribution  ) (⋅ g  is known as the mixing 
distribution and for this reason the resulting model is often named mixed logit (MXL). The 
MXL probability then takes the following form: 










l i i il





   (4) 
These choice probabilities cannot be calculated exactly because the integral in (4) usually 
does not have a closed form solution. Therefore, they are simulated by drawing values of  μ  
from its distribution and included in the likelihood function to obtain the simulated likelihood. 
Thus, β and μ parameters are estimated through simulated maximum likelihood. 
The greater flexibility of MXL has been known to researchers for some time, but the 
computational burden of simulation techniques have discouraged scholars from applying them 
to empirical applications on large datasets. With the improvements in computer speed these 
techniques are becoming increasingly popular in many fields of applied economics, such as, for 
example, the choice of alternative modes of transport, recreational sites and differentiated 
products (Train, 2003, p. 138). To the best of our knowledge this is the first study that applies 
MXL to location decisions of MNFs. 
2.3. Caveats in the interpretation of results 
As mentioned above, we estimate the determinants of foreign firms’ location choice, 
conditioned on having chosen to invest, rather than having opted for other market entry modes, 
or not serving the market at all. It is worth mentioning some of the implications of different 
assumptions about the entry-mode strategy on the interpretation of estimated coefficients and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
increases dramatically, making the implementation of search rather cumbersome. Further, even if one were  able 
to find the most appropriate structure of nesting, this would still accommodate rather simple patterns of correlation   8
probabilities. Let us begin by assuming, in line with previous studies (for example, Devereux 
and Griffith, 1998), that the firms’ internationalization process can be described as we have 
already sketched it in section 2.1: firms decide whether to serve the EU market and, if so, they 
decide whether to export, carry out local production (FDI). In the FDI case, firms then choose 
the location for their plants. Under this assumption, the choice model takes a nested structure, 
where the odds ratio between any two location choices (in the FDI nest) turns out to be 
independent from a change in the probability of other choices made at the upper level (export 
vs. FDI), since the error terms are not correlated across nests. An increase in the profitability of 
internationalization modes different from FDI (say exporting) would simply scale down, 
proportionally, the probability of each FDI choice, but it would not affect the odd ratios 
between locations. Thus, neglecting the first decision step does not affect the interpretation of 
the coefficients attached to the location determinants. 
If some unobserved factors influence not only the location choice, but also the probability of 
exporting, the assumption we have just made would be violated, correlation between 
alternatives in the FDI nest and in the export nest would occur and bias the predicted 
probabilities in an unknown way. In fact, under those circumstances, a change in the 
profitability of the export alternative would affect the probability of locating in some regions 
more than in others. Given the high dimensionality of the problem (caused by the large number 
of alternatives in the model) and the lack of any data on non-FDI alternatives, assessing the 
direction of such a bias in the context of this paper is not possible. However, as the following 
example illustrates, the use of mixed logit models should lessen this problem. One rather 
recurrent type of investments in the EU is the so-called export-platform FDI, which occurs 
when firms set-up production in one region and from there they export to the larger market 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
among alternatives. For example, it would not allow one alternative to belong to more than one nest.    9
accessible from that location.
3 An unobserved shock, making, for example, export more 
profitable (say a drop in tariff barriers or in transport costs) would affect the probability of 
locating production in regions which can be used as export-platform, relatively more than the 
probability of location in other regions. As noted in section 2.2, a MXL specification allows us 
to model the error component in a very rich and flexible way. For example, in our case we can 
include in the error terms variables, such as host region’s market potential and its distance from 
the investor’s headquarters
4, which may affect both exporting and export-platform FDI. This 
allows us to control for correlation in profits among regions which would be more affected by 
the unobserved shock described above. In general terms, we believe that using MXL and 
introducing in the error component a large set of variables which may affect both location in a 
particular region and other modes of internationalisation reduces the extent of potential biases 
arising from the sample selection we have just illustrated, since it controls for patterns of 
correlation in error terms in a flexible and non-predetermined way.  
A different source of bias arises from not including all possible locations in the choice set of 
MNFs. In particular, we do not consider Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as 
alternative locations. This determines a lower range of variability in some location 
determinants, such as tax rates, labor costs, unemployment rates, agglomeration economies and 
infrastructures, which are substantially lower/worse in those countries. This limited variability 
may reduce the generalization of our results. However, it is worth mentioning that FDI to 
CEECs were relatively low in the early and mid nineties and had a boost from the late nineties 
onwards. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that they were not in the choice set of MNFs 
investing in Europe in the period considered in our analysis (1991-1999).  
                                                           
3 This appeared to be a strategy followed by US firms investing in Ireland and some regions of the UK and by 
French and German MNFs investing in Spain and Portugal in the aftermath of the creation of the EU Single 
Market (Neary, 2002; Rhys, 2004). 
4 See section 3 for a comprehensive discussion of the variables used in estimation.   10
3. Data and variables  
The analysis makes use of the Elios dataset (European Linkages and Ownership Structure), 
built at the University of Urbino and based on Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom, which 
provides information on location choices of 5,509 affiliates of MNFs between 1991 and 1999 
over a set of 50 NUTS-1 regions in 8 EU countries (France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom). Parent companies are of different nationalities: the 
single largest home country is the US (25%), but the majority of investors is from EU countries 
(60%). Thus, each firm faces 50 possible choices and the dependent variable is equal to 1 if 
firm i is set in region j and zero for all regions different from j.
5 Independent variables have 
been selected according to the existing literature on location choices of MNFs. In particular, we 
control for market size and distance, agglomeration economies, characteristics of the local 
input market, national fiscal policy and EU Cohesion Policy.  Below is a brief illustration of 
the variables used (further summarised in Table 1) and the main theoretical justifications for 
their use as location determinants.  
Market size, measured by the regional GDP should make MNFs location relatively more 
profitable, as the larger sales would allow to recover the fixed set-up cost of foreign 
production. Following Head and Mayer (2004) and the theory of export-platform FDI (Neary, 
2002), we include also market potential for region i, measured by the distance-weighted market 
size of all regions different from i. Per-capita GDP is also introduced to capture the purchasing 
power in the region. Distance of each region’s main city from the investor headquarter, is 
included as a proxy for trade costs. On the one hand, a higher distance should increase the 
probability of market-seeking FDI, as opposed to export and, thus, increase the likelihood of 
location in a given region. On the other hand, firms engaging in vertical FDI would seek closer 
                                                           
5 Since the unit of our analysis is the foreign affiliate and not its headquarter, each individual affiliate enters the 
sample only once and, thus, our dataset constitutes a cross-section, even though the period of the analysis covers a 
decade.   11
locations, due the large flow of trade in intermediate goods associated with the vertical 
fragmentation of production.  
Agglomeration economies have been found to be a key determinant of location in virtually 
every recent empirical work, suggesting that industrial firms tend to localize where other firms 
of the same industry are present. The reasons for this result are well known: agglomeration 
determines technological and pecuniary externalities, such as access to a more stable labor 
market, availability of intermediate goods, production services, skilled manpower and 
knowledge spillover between adjacent firms (see Devereux et al. 2007 for a recent discussion 
of the role of agglomeration economies in attracting FDI decisions). In the case of foreign-
owned firms, agglomeration economies derive not only from the generic number of local 
incumbents, but also from the number of other foreign firms operating in the same 
geographical area. As suggested by Head et al. (1999), foreign investors may have less initial 
knowledge about regional characteristics than their domestic counterparts and interpret the 
presence of other foreign firms in a given region as a signal of profitability of a given location. 
We capture these effects by introducing the log of the number of (domestic and foreign) firms 
in the same region and in the same sector where firm i operates. We also control for the fact 
that agglomeration economies may reach limit values and agglomeration diseconomies 
eventually emerge
6, by introducing spatial lags
7 for these variables. A measure of firm-specific 
agglomeration, obtained as the number of affiliates of the same multinational group in each 
region, which we call MNF experience, is introduced to capture agglomeration economies 
generated among firms belonging to the same business entity. The idea is that to the extent that 
                                                           
6 Firms operating in markets with relatively large numbers of firms face stronger competition in product and labor 
markets. This acts as a centrifugal force and favors to location of activities away from, but still in the 
neighborhood of, highly agglomerated areas.  
7 Spatial lags are defined as the distance-weighted sum of the values of agglomeration variables in all other 
regions and are expected to capture spatial correlation and any congestion effect, which will discourage location in 
highly agglomerated regions and favour establishment in regions nearby.   12
firms gain experience and get acquainted with a given context, uncertainty is likely to decrease 
and MNFs will perceive lower risks from further investments (Castellani and Zanfei, 2004). As 
a result, MNFs experience will determine persistence in firms’ location choices
8.  
A number of characteristics of the local input market  is also controlled for. As for the 
labour market, we use a measure of the average regional wage, the secondary school enrolment 
ratio and the unemployment rate. While the expected impact of schooling on location choices 
is positive, since, ceteris paribus, a better educated workforce should increase productivity, and 
thus profitability, of activities in a given region, the impact of wages and unemployment is not 
univocal. In fact, lower wages may attract firms seeking for lower labour costs, but high wages 
may signal highly skilled workers which may in turn attract location of higher value added 
activities. As for unemployment, firms may interpret it both as a measure of a large supply of 
labour, which would attract firms, and as an indicator of a relatively rigid labour market, which 
would discourage them. Population density is used to proxy for the cost of land, which should 
make regions less attractive. However, this measure may also pick up the effect of the 
agglomeration of consumers, which would instead increase attractiveness. A measure of the 
regional stock of infrastructure is also introduced to capture the cost of setting-up a plant and of 
accessing the market from a given location. Finally, the share of R&D expenditures in regional 
GDP is introduced to account for the technological knowledge produced in the region. Regions 
with better infrastructures and higher R&D intensities should be more attractive to foreign 
investors.  
National fiscal policy, measured by the national effective average corporate tax rate (as 
developed by Devereux et al., 2002b) and the tax wedge on labour, should reduce profits and 
thus discourage MNFs location. However, empirical evidence is mixed, as fiscal policy may be 
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problem.   13
ineffective in presence of agglomeration economies and firms may be willing to pay higher 
taxes in exchange for more public goods (Benassy-Quere et al., 2000).  
- Table 1 about here - 
With regards to EU Cohesion Policy, it is important to remark that the EU has no specific 
policy instrument ‘dedicated’ to the attraction of FDI, so that foreign firms benefit from 
‘generic’ public incentives, such as those co-financed as a part of EU cohesion policy.  
The EU Cohesion Policy, which accounts for about one-third of the EU budget, aims at 
achieving social and economic cohesion, by helping transform and modernise the structure of 
relatively poor economies in order to prepare them for competition within the EU Single 
Market and, thus, reducing regional unbalances. The main instruments of the EU Cohesion 
Policy are the Structural Funds (SF) and the Cohesion Funds (CF), which represent about 80% 
and 8% of the budget, respectively. These funds are granted mainly for the provision of public 
goods, such as building economic and social infrastructures and, from this perspective, should 
be negatively correlated with plant set-up costs, thus increasing the attractiveness of each 
location (Kellenberg, 2006)
9.  
SF are allocated over a 5-7 years programming period (so far the periods have been 1989-
1993, 1994-1999, 2000-2006, 2007-2013) and have two priority objectives: Objective 1 and 
Objective 2. The former accounts for about two-thirds of total SF and it is aimed at supporting 
the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind, by 
providing them with the basic infrastructure or encouraging investments in business economic 
activity (also through direct subsidies). Regions eligible for Objective 1 funds are those NUTS-
2 regions with a per-capita GDP lower than the 75% of the EU average, with a very low 
                                                           
9 Some 30% of the Structural Funds are spent on infrastructure investment, mainly transport infrastructure as well 
as telecommunications and energy. This emphasis put on infrastructure is justified in part on the ground that 
disparities in infrastructure in the EU are greater than incomes. A further 30% of the Structural Funds are devoted   14
population density and/or ultra-peripheral regions. Objective 2 aims to revitalise all areas 
facing structural difficulties, whether industrial, rural, urban or dependent on fisheries. Though 
situated in areas whose development level is close to the Community average, Objective 2 
regions are faced with different types of socio-economic difficulties that are often the source of 
high unemployment. For each programming period, the European Commission allocates the SF 
by Member States taking into account a set of criteria: eligible population, regional and 
national prosperity (in terms of per-capita income, infrastructure endowment and education 
attainment) and the relative severity of the structural problems, especially the unemployment 
rate. Member States are then responsible for the allocation of these Funds to the regions. While 
the final distribution of Funds largely reflects the criteria defined by the Commission, there is 
some political discretion, which may create a mismatch between the structural backwardness of 
regions and the amount of funds actually received.
10 
The CF was established in 1992 to complement the SF and it was intended to help countries 
which had a GDP per capita lower than the 90% of the EU average in 1992 (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain). In the nineties, the main beneficiary of this Fund was Spain (where more 
than 50% of the budget has been allocated), followed by Portugal (22%), Greece (16%) and 
Ireland (10%).  
We control for the role played by the different instruments of the EU Cohesion Policy by 
introducing the log of the amount of SF allocated to each region in the period 1989-1993, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
to strengthening education and training systems and supporting labor market policies. The remaining 40% are 
subsidies to industries. 
10 We have tested for this event by regressing the amount of SF received by each region under the programming 
period 1989-1993 on a number of structural characteristics, such as being an Objective 1 region, per-capita GDP, 
unemployment rate, infrastructure, human capital and population density. The coefficients of these variables have 
the expected sign and are statistically significant. The adjusted R-squared is rather high (0.60), but the portion of 
interregional variability in the amount of SF that is not explained by this set of structural variables is still high. 
Results are available from the authors upon request.   15
dummy variable taking value 1 if a region is eligible for Objective 1
11 and a CF dummy equal 
value 1 if a region belongs to Ireland, Portugal or Spain (Greek regions are not included in our 
sample). 
4. Location determinants of foreign firms in Europe: results 
As we discussed in Section 2, we exploit the flexibility of MXL models to estimate the 
location determinants of MNFs in the EU regions over the nineties. The MXL has been 
specified so that we exploit as much information as possible to capture correlation among the 
unobserved portions of profit stemming from location in different regions, as illustrated by 
equation (3). In Table 3 we report the results from the estimation of such a MXL model. In 
particular, in column (1) we present the results for the whole sample, while in columns (2) and 
(3) we split the sample into investors originating in Europe and elsewhere
12.  
Before commenting on the determinants of MNFs location choices, let us briefly discuss the 
patterns of substitution between choices which emerge from the estimated standard deviations 
associated with the variables introduced in the the error component
13. In all the samples, a 
significant standard deviation has been estimated for previous experience of the MNF in each 
region, for population density and distance from the home country. This suggests that if a 
region becomes less attractive (due to a change in some of its observable or unobservable 
attributes), MNFs seem more likely to locate where they already had some plants, in other 
regions sharing similar population densities and at similar distance from the home country. To 
                                                           
11 Since our analysis is at the NUTS-1 level, we set equal to one the Objective 1 dummy for all the NUTS-1 which 
include at least one NUTS-2 region eligible for Objective 1. Table A.2 shows the list of Objective 1 regions, as 
well as the distribution of SF allocated over the 1989-1993 period to all 50 regions. To avoid that the dummy 
variable “Objective 1” would pick up nonlinearities in the effect of income, we include also per capita income 
squared in our location equation.  
12 MXL models have been estimated through the GAUSS routine available on Kenneth Train’s website 
(http://elsa.berkeley.edu/Software/abstracts/train0196.html), using 100 Halton draws. 
13 To save space, Table 3 does not report either the standard deviations associated with the country dummies, or 
those which did not turn significant in any of the sample used.   16
appreciate this result, it is worth noting that it is not a single characteristic which affects 
substitution, but it is a combination of different attributes which shapes the degree of perceived 
similarity among the regions and which would hardly be captured by any combination of nests, 
grouping mutually exclusive alternatives
14.  
Let us now discuss the results on the estimated mean of the parameters associated with the 
various location determinants in Table 3. As expected, in the whole sample the probability of a 
MNF locating in one region increases with the regional market size and potential, with the 
extent of agglomeration economies, with the R&D intensity of the region and with a lower 
taxation on labour. Location seems also more likely in regions closer to a MNF’s home 
country. However, this result needs to be interpreted with caution, since in the whole sample it 
may pick up the fact that the majority of investors are from the EU and, thus, are closer to the 
host regions.  
As regards the EU Cohesion Policy, we find that, after controlling for nonlinearity in the 
effect of per-capita income, being eligible for Objective 1 funds does not affect a region’s 
attractiveness. It is rather the amount of SF allocated to a region that seems to be a significant 
determinant of the profits MNFs expect to extract from locating production in that region. 
Furthermore, regions within countries that receive CF are significantly more attractive than 
other regions. 
In column (2) and (3) of Table 3 we show the results of separate regressions for the sample 
of European and non-European investors. Findings are broadly consistent with those of the 
whole sample, but some differences also emerge. In particular, location decisions of non-
European firms are substantially more responsive to increases in the amount of SF, while CF 
                                                           
14 For example, in a companion paper using the same data-set  used here (Basile et al., 2007), we estimate a nested 
logit model where regions are grouped into country nests and find that this would not adequately capture the 
pattern of correlation between choices (as the inclusive value parameters fall outside the 0-1 interval for most 
nests). This result, while revealing that national boundaries do not matter in most location choices, highlights that 
nested structures may not be able to fully able to capture substitution patterns among location alternatives.   17
seem to play a positive and significant role for European MNFs. This may reflect a higher 
propensity of the latter to set-up plant in Southern Europe and in Spain and Portugal (which 
where the largest recipients of CF) in particular.
15  
Interesting differences between European and non-European MNFs emerge with respect to 
some of the market-related variables, the labor market and the role of taxation. First, while the 
former place significant weight on market potential, the latter are more attracted towards richer 
markets (with higher per-capita income). Second, while high unemployment seems to attract 
European investors, non-European MNFs are attracted by a high wage, which we interpret as a 
search for more skilled workers. Both sets of results describe different patterns of investment 
followed by the two groups of firms. On the one hand, the European pattern is consistent with a 
process of re-organization of production to serve the EU Single Market, in search for a 
combination of relatively low production cost and good market access. On the other hand, the 
non-European pattern is consistent with a search for rich markets and possibly skilled workers 
and strategic assets
16. A third difference between the two groups of firms concerns the effect of 
taxation. In fact, both the tax wedge on labor and the corporate tax rate have a negative and 
significant effect on the location of non-European firms, but not in the European sample. One 
may speculate that this difference has to do with the different role of the welfare state, which, 
especially in Continental and Nordic Europe places a relatively higher burden on taxpayers, in 
exchange for more public goods. In this perspective, European MNFs may not have such a 
                                                           
15 The motor vehicles industry in Spain is an interesting example of such a process. In fact, Spanish production 
and export of cars have more than doubled from the mid ’80s to the end of the ‘90s and Spain is now the third 
largest European manufacturer of cars, hosting production plants of GM, Ford, PSA and Volkswagen, and 
exporting more than 80% of its production (Rhys, 2004). 
16 In this perspective, one would expect a positive impact of R&D intensity on the location of non-European 
plants, while the coefficient with R&D is significant only in the European sample. This may reveal the fact that in 
the sample of non-European firms the effect of R&D intensity may be picked up by the positive and significant 
effect of per-capita income.   18
strong preference towards lower taxes, if this comes at expense of a lower amount of public 
goods. 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper analyzes the determinants of location choices of MNFs in Europe, by estimating a 
mixed logit model on a sample of 5,509 firms locating foreign plants in 50 European regions 
over the 1991-1999 period. Our results have interesting implications both as concerns 
methodology and MNFs location determinants. In terms of methodological issues, we support 
the idea that using a MXL represents a significant improvement. Especially when addressing a 
problem with many alternatives in the choice set, conditional and nested logit models may 
impose too restrictive substitution patterns among choices and lead to biased estimation. In our 
case, we find that the degree of similarity (correlation) in the unobserved portion of profits 
stemming from different regions is not fully captured by relatively simple groupings of regions 
such as in a nested logit framework. Rather, it is a combination of factors such as population 
density, distance from the investors’ headquarter and the degree of MNFs previous experience 
of each location, which shape substitution patterns among regions. As concerns MNFs location 
determinants, we support the well established result that agglomeration economies play a key 
role in determining location choices, both for European and non-European MNFs, but we also 
find that a number of determinants play a different role for the two groups of firms. In 
particular, while the former are attracted towards regions with lower per-capita income, 
relatively high unemployment and large market potential, the latter seem to prefer regions with 
higher wage and per-capita income regions and countries with lower taxes on labour and 
corporate income.  
Finally, we find that the EU Cohesion Policy, creating more favourable conditions for 
investments in Peripheral regions through funding training, infrastructure and R&D activities, 
have succeeded in attracting MNFs, counteracting agglomeration forces which lead to a   19
concentration of economic activities in Core regions. In particular, our results suggest that 
regions receiving a larger overall amount of SF and those belonging to countries which 
received CF have been more attractive to foreign investors. While this is an interesting result, 
which adds to a growing literature on the impact of structural policy on growth and cohesion in 
the European Union, further work is required along these lines. First, an extension to the more 
recent years is necessary, in order to capture the impact of EU Enlargement, which resulted 
both into a larger choice set for MNFs locating in the EU, and in new challenges for EU 
cohesion policies. Second, one would like to control for more direct measures of EU policies, 
such as the actual amount of funds transferred to the various regions for different activities, for 
example training, infrastructures and R&D. Careful measurement of national and regional 
policies specifically targeted to FDI is also required, in order to assess the differential impact of 
EU versus national and regional policies correctly. Third, further investigation should be 
devoted to assess whether and to what extent the EU cohesion policy has distorted the efficient 
allocation of multinational activity in Europe and eventually affected the long run growth of 
Europe.   20
Appendix: The NUTS classification 
The Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) is a hierarchical classification of 
administrative areas, used across the EU for statistical purposes, i.e. for collection, 
development and harmonization of Community regional statistics. At the top of the hierarchy 
(NUTS-0) are the individual Member States, below that are levels 1 to 3
17. Generally speaking, 
territorial units are defined in terms of the existing administrative units in the Member States. 
The NUTS level to which an administrative unit belongs is determined on the basis of 
population thresholds. Where the population of a Member State as a whole is below the 
minimum threshold for a NUTS level, that Member State itself constitutes a NUTS territorial 
unit of that level (thus, Ireland consists of only one NUTS-2 region, while Sweden consists of 
only one NUTS-1 region).  
The NUTS classification serves as a reference for the framing of EU regional policies: for 
the purposes of appraisal of eligibility for aid from the Structural Funds, regions whose 
development is lagging behind (regions concerned by Objective 1) have been classified at the 
NUTS-2 level. For the present work, we utilized NUTS-1 as the elemental location choice, as it 
represents (in the context of our econometric analysis) the best solution to the trade off 
between complexity and exhaustiveness. In fact, NUTS-0 (countries) represent too large 
geographical units to study MNFs location behaviour, as countries encompass a lot of 
heterogeneity among them and do not account completely for the location factor which MNFs 
rely upon. The use of NUTS-2 or NUTS-3 levels would imply the inclusion of a too large 
number of alternatives, which would make estimation unfeasible. In Table A.1 we summarize 
the NUTS classification for the 8 countries in our sample and indicate the list of regions used 
in the analysis.  
                                                           
17 Here, we refer to the nomenclature operating during the period of our analysis. Classification criteria changed in 
July 2003.     21
Table A.1 – The NUTS classification for EU countries 
 
Country  NUTS 1   NUTS 2   NUTS 3  




DE1 BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG; DE2 BAYERN; DE3 BERLIN; DE5 
BREMEN; DE6 HAMBURG; DE7 HESSEN; DE9 NIEDERSACHSEN; DEA 
NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN; DEB RHEINLAND-PFALZ; DEC SAARLAND; 
DEF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN; 
The following regions have been excluded due to the lack of data on Structural 
Funds 
DE4 BRANDENBURG; DE8 MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN; DED SACHSEN; 
DEE SACHSEN-ANHALT; DEG THUERINGEN 
Regierungsbezirke  Kreise  
FR 
(France) 
Z.E.A.T + DOM: 
FR1 ILE-DE-FRANCE; FR2 BASSIN PARISIEN; FR3 NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS; 
FR4 EST; FR5 OUEST; FR6 SUD-OUEST; FR7 CENTRE-EST; FR8 
MEDITERRANEE;  
The following region has been excluded due to the lack of data on foreign plant 
location 
FR9 DEPARTEMENTS D'OUTRE-MER 
Régions + DOM   Départements 
+ DOM  
IT (Italy) 
Gruppi di regioni:  
IT1 NORD OVEST; IT2 LOMBARDIA; IT3 NORD EST; IT4 EMILIA-
ROMAGNA; IT5 CENTRO; IT6 LAZIO; IT7 ABRUZZO-MOLISE; IT8 
CAMPANIA; IT9 SUD; ITA SICILIA; ITB SARDEGNA 
Regioni   Provincie  
SE 





UK1 NORTH; UK2 YORKSHIRE AND HUMBERSIDE; UK3  EAST 
MIDLANDS; UK4  EAST ANGLIA; UK5 SOUTH EAST (UK); UK6 SOUTH 
WEST (UK); UK7 WEST MIDLANDS; UK8 NORTH WEST (UK); UK9 WALES; 
UKA SCOTLAND; UKB NORTHERN IRELAND  




Countries eligible for the Cohesion Fund 
ES (Spain) 
Agrupacion de comunidades autonomas : 
ES1 NOROESTE; ES2 NORESTE; ES3 COMUNIDAD DE MADRID; ES4 
CENTRO; ES5 ESTE; ES6 SUR;  
The following region has been excluded due to the lack of data on foreign plant 
location 
ES7 CANARIAS  
Comunidades 
autonomas + 











Continente + Regiones autonomas : 
PT1 CONTINENTE;  
The following regions have been excluded due to the lack of data on foreign plant 
location 
PT2 ACORES; PT3 MADEIRA 
Comissaoes de 
coordenaçao 
regional + Regioes 
autonomas  
Grupos de 
Concelhos    22
Table A.2 – Distribution of new foreign affiliates of European and non-European MNF in the period 
1991-1999, and of SF allocated in the period 1989-1993, by NUTS1 region. Percentage values 
 




























Germany   16.2  12.2  4.7  Ireland  yes  0.7  1.0  6.0 
−  Baden-Wuerttemberg no  3.0  1.8  0.4 Italy    3.8 2.1  11.0 
−  Bayern no  2.6  2.3  0.8  −  Nord Ovest  no  0.3  0.3  1.0 
−  Berlin no  0.5  0.3  0.5  −  Lombardia no  1.9  1.3  0.3 
−  Bremen no  0.1  0.1  0.2  −  Nord Est  no  0.5  0.0  0.8 
−  Hamburg no  0.5  0.6  0.0  −  Emilia Romagna  no  0.3  0.2  0.3 
−  Hessen no  2.3  2.2  0.2  −  Centro no  0.3  0.1  1.0 
−  Niedersachsen no  1.2  0.8  0.6  −  Lazio no  0.1  0.1  0.4 
−  Nordrhein-Westfalen no  4.5  3.3  1.4 −  Abruzzo Molise  yes  0.1  0.1  0.6 
−  Rheinland-Pfalz no  0.8  0.4  0.2  −  Campania yes  0.1  0.0  1.5 
−  Saarland no  0.1  0.1  0.2  −  Sud yes  0.1  0.0  2.7 
−  Schleswig-Holstein no  0.6  0.4  0.2  −  Sicilia yes  0.1  0.0  1.4 
Spain    6.4 3.0  18.1  −  Sardegna yes  0.0  0.0  1.0 
−  Noroeste yes  0.3  0.1  3.6  Portugal  yes  2.6 0.7 1.8 
−  Noreste no  0.8  0.5  0.9  Sweden  no  2.1 0.8 0.0 
−  Com. de Madrid  no  1.9  1.4  0.3  United Kingdom    17.7 31.8  8.4 
−  Centro yes  0.4  0.0  5.0  −  North no  0.5  1.2  0.9 
−  Este  no 2.7  0.8  3.2 
−  Yorkshire-
Humberside no  1.3  1.5  0.8 
−  Sur yes  0.3  0.2  5.1  −  East Midlands  no  1.5  1.8  0.3 
France    11.3 5.7  6.3  −  East Anglia  no  0.5  1.0  0.1 
−  Ile de France  no  2.8  1.7  0.0  −  South East (Uk)  no  7.8  15.6  0.2 
−  Bassin Parisien  no  1.9  1.0  1.5  −  South West (Uk)  no  0.9  1.6  0.3 
−  Nord Pas de Calais  no  0.8  0.4  0.5  −  West Midlands  no  2.1  3.5  0.9 
−  Est no  1.8  0.4  0.7  −  North West (Uk)  no  1.6  2.5  1.6 
−  Ouest no  0.8  0.6  1.0  −  Wales no  0.5  0.9  0.7 
−  Sud Ouest  no  1.0  0.4  0.9  −  Scotland yes  0.7  1.9  1.4 
−  Centre Est  no  1.6  1.0  0.7  −  Northern Ireland  yes  0.2  0.2  1.3 
−  Mediterranee no  0.6  0.2  0.9  Total    100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table 1 - Variable List and Description   
 
Variables Description  Source  Type 
Market  
Size  Log of Value Added in region j  Eurostat  Region 
Market  
Potential 
Log of the sum of value added in all regions r≠j 
weighted by the inverse euclidean distance between 
the major cities in r and j 
Eurostat Region 
Per-capita GDP  Log of (regional GDP/population)  Eurostat  Region 
Overall 
agglomeration 
Log of the number of establishments in region j (and 




Log of the cumulative number of foreign-owned 




MNF Experience  Log of the number of firms in region j controlled by 
the same parent of firm n  Elios  Firm-
Region 
Wages  Log of (wages/total employment)  Eurostat  Region 
Population density 
Log (Regional Population / Total area in Km
2 of the 
region)  Eurostat Region 
R&D intensity 
Log (Regional R&D expenditures at 1995 / Regional 
Value added)  Eurostat Region 
Secondary school 
enrolment ratio 
Log (Students enrolled in sec. school at 1995 / Total pop. 
aged 10-19)  Eurostat Region 
Unemployment 
Rate  Log of unemployment rate  Eurostat  Region 
Tax wedge on 
employment 
Log of (sum of social contributions, income taxes 





Structural Funds  Log of European Structural Funds expenditure 
allocated to the region over the period 1989-1993 
European 
Commision  Region 
Objective 1 region  1 if the region is within Obj.1, 0 otherwise    Region 
Cohesion country  1 if the country receives Cohesion Fund, 0 otherwise   Country 
Public 
Infrastructure  Index of infrastructure stock in region j at 1985  Confindustria  Region 
Corporate tax rate  Log of national effective average corporate tax rate  Institute for 
Fiscal Studies  Country 
Distance from 
home country 
Log of the geodesic distance between the main city 




Table 3 – The determinants of MNFs location decisions in Europe – Mixed logit regressions 
 
  All firms  European firms  Non-european firms 
  Coeff. Std. err    Coeff. Std. err    Coeff. Std.  err  
Location determinants                
Structural  funds  0.036 (0.017)  **  0.025 (0.021)    0.104 (0.034)  ***
Objective 1 region (dummy)  -0.057 (0.143)    -0.110 (0.153)    0.104  (0.237)   
Cohesion  country  (dummy)  0.508  (0.195) *** 1.008  (0.263) *** -2.351 (0.984) ** 
Market  size  0.134 (0.068)  **  0.094 (0.083)    0.128 (0.143)   
Market  potential  0.358  (0.180) **  0.480  (0.216) **  -0.544 (0.372)  
Per-capita  GDP  -0.914 (1.324)   -2.718 (1.615) *  4.648  (2.808) * 
Per-capita  GDP  (squared)  0.152  (0.230)   0.396  (0.279)   -0.638 (0.486)  
Tax  wedge  on  employment  -1.397 (0.435) *** 0.423  (0.524)   -5.033 (1.061) ***
Effective Average Tax Rate  0.190  (0.149)    0.375  (0.186)  **  -1.065  (0.495)  ** 
Infrastructure  index  -0.140 (0.148)   -0.246 (0.190)   0.048  (0.283)  
MNF  experience  1.900 (0.074)  *** 1.735 (0.085)  *** 2.269 (0.164)  ***
Overall  aggl.  0.336 (0.054)  *** 0.275 (0.062)  *** 0.467 (0.112)  ***
Foreign  firms  aggl.  0.484 (0.057)  *** 0.480 (0.067)  *** 0.442 (0.112)  ***
Overall  aggl.  (spatial  lag)  -0.425 (0.313)   -0.433 (0.369)   0.094  (0.629)  
Foreign firms aggl. (spatial lag)  0.384  (0.335)    0.252  (0.399)    0.579  (0.661)   
Wage  -0.037 (0.125)   -0.232 (0.155)   0.550  (0.256) ** 
Secondary  Schooling  rate  0.302 (0.198)    0.194 (0.239)    0.441 (0.413)   
Unemployment  rate  -0.069 (0.077)   -0.200 (0.100) **  0.132  (0.163)  
Population  density  0.088  (0.083)   0.201  (0.104) *  -0.059 (0.183)  
R&D  intensity  0.118  (0.050) **  0.185  (0.061) *** -0.047 (0.096)  
Distance  from  home  country  -0.779 (0.060) *** -0.966 (0.058) *** 1.082  (0.543) ** 
Error component 
(standard  deviation)§                
MNF  experience  2.091 (0.140)  *** 1.880 (0.157)  *** 2.620 (0.290)  ***
Population  density  0.414 (0.115)  *** 0.335 (0.144)  **  0.580 (0.211)  ***
Distance  from  home  country  1.405 (0.121)  *** 0.696 (0.165)  *** 1.796 (0.993)  * 
Market  size  0.063 (0.112)    0.041 (0.120)    0.294 (0.168)  * 
Per-capita  GDP  0.368 (0.233)    0.152 (0.298)    0.983 (0.462)  ** 
Foreign  firms  aggl.  0.038 (0.069)    0.131 (0.063)  **  0.060 (0.099)   
                
Number of firms  5509  3676  1833 
Simulated Log-L MXL  -16585.2  -11126.3  -5283.1 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is set in region j and zero for all regions different from j. Asterisks 
denote confidence levels: * p<.10 and ** p<.05. MXL models have been estimated through the GAUSS routine available on 
Kenneth Train’s website (http://elsa.berkeley.edu/Software/abstracts/train0196.html), using 100 Halton draws. 
 
§ In each regression the error component includes all the 21 variables used also as location determinants, as well as 8 host 
country dummies. For all these variables we have an estimated standard deviation. To save space, we do not report estimates 
associated with the country dummies and those that are not significant in any of the samples used. Standard deviations for all 
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